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N the last eight months our new post-War world has -, been br'ought brutally face to face with the question whether it really differs in any essential iteln from the old world of 1914. Its ark and covenant have run into a' storm of primeval passions and the result looks dismally like ship-wreck. When, in the autumn of 1935, the League of Nations, for the first time in its fifteen years of existence, brought into operation against an aggressor the sanctions of Article XVI of the Covenan t, the hopes of the new-worldlings ran high~ -At last, , after the tragic falterings of 193I and 1932, there ap- peared to emerge a clear resolu tion to assert the principles of collective security against the anarchy of national lust. But now, in June, 1936 , national lust is triumphant, and a disillusioned civilization asks in dejection whether all its plans for keeping the peace have been so much moonshine. "}Ceeping the peace" has a vain, tintinnating sound in a world of marching troops and clanging armalnen t factories. Could-the League of Nations in October, 1935, still be considered a serious factor in international politics? Were sanctions a farce solemnly played out by politicians with one eye upon the formal satisfaction of treaty requirements, as a sop to earnest peace movemen ts at home, and the other upon the condi tion of the aggressor, who must not be enraged to the point of upsetting the apple-cart, League, pacts, alliances, and all? Sometimes the world seemed to take this view; witness the shocked astonishment exhibited in so many quarters . when there first appeared to be a likelihood of oil embargo. "Stop oil!" shouted politicians and newspapers. "Why, man, if you stop oil, Italy won't be able to carryon ,her war."
Or was the remarkably unanimous and singularly ineffective action against I taly an earnest if bela ted effort by the League to do its essential job, and at the same time to patch up a prestige shattered by the Manchurian episode? Cynically defied in 1931 by a major power whos~ guilt was duly established in trial before its peers, it had stood quiescent because its greatest members feared to give a lead. That display of calcu~ lating poltroonery was the signal for all the malcon ten ts to arm themselves with arrogance. "Japan could do it," sang Germany and Italy, (C so can we." And in October, 1935 , when the direct threat to national interests, following upon a pop-qlar demonstration in favour of the Covenant, had driven one of those -greatest members to , shelter in the League, the vindication of reason and justice came, or so it would appear, fatally late.
The weight of evidence is for the second view. Neither French nor British governments have ever treated the League of Nations with conscious hypocrisy. This is true even of England's National government, tortuous as its course in foreign policy has been. ~ut they have ' lacked fai th, and ' they have tried to bolster up the League as a line of defence with national armaments and a fluctuating system of unstable alliances, both of ~hich are devices utterly incompatible with the esse' nce of collective security. They were like men trying to build up a COmlTIOn fortress and all the time tearing away its foundations as ll1aterial for their own private castles. All that they built was in a perpetual state of crun1 bling, and the welkin rang with their complain ts of each other.
And so what happened last win ter on the peaceful shores of Lake Leman was a serious endeavour to use the League's penultimate means of restraining a Covenant-breaker. Penultimate,· because there was no recourse to militar,y sanctions. Serious, but neither quite wholehearted nor yet very bold. I t was a cau tious experiment, not a confident exercise of the police-power. -"Without committing ourselves too far/' the "sanctionists" seem to say, "let's see what can be done by a little mild pressure." The total result has been a compelling demonstration of the "futility and folly of half-lneasures.
A short analysis of the machinery employed in the application of sanctions will help towards the understanding of what follows. In the first place, Council and Assembly agreed that I taly had resorted to war against Abyssinia in disregard' of its obligations under the Covenant. Article XVI theteupon came into operation, lnaking it the duty of all other members of the League to ' sever their trade and financial relations with the aggressor. The terms of this article do not specify the precise ' measures to be taken by the members in perfQrm.ance of the duty which it imposes; these are' left to be determined by the members themselves. But, in order that all might work to one plan, the Assembly on October 10, 1935, adopted a resolution · recommending that a Committee of Co-ordination should be set up consisting of one delegate, assisted by experts, from each member of the League other than I taly and Abyssinia, the parties to the actual dispute. This Committee was duly constituted, held its first session from October 11 to 19, 1935 , and made five proposals.
The firs t proposal was tha t the members should at once prohibit the export of arms, munitions~ and imple-men ts of war to I taly and I talian possessions; the second, tha t they should preven t in their terri tories the raising of loans and the gran t of credit for the I tali an governmen t or for corporations or individuals ,in I talian territory; the third, that they should prohibit the importation ' of Italian goods; the fO, urth, that they should prohibit the export to all I talian terri tory of transport animals, rubber, and a long list of minerals including-what is of peculiar in t~test to Canada-nickel, and should, moreover, take the necessary steps to preven t any of these articles, exported to countries other than Italy and its possessions, from being re-exported to Italian territory; fifth and last, that the members applying sanctions should, by increasing trade among themselves" compensate each other as far as possible for losses arising ou t of sanctions.
I t was one thing to make proposals; another to see them put into effect. So large a body as the Co-ordination C' ommi ttee could hardly be kept in continuous session at Geneva for the unpredictable length of time during which sanctions would have to be maln tained. The task of following up the action taken, and of proposing new measures as circumstances might demand, was delegated to a body set up at an earlier date by the League to study the questlon of sanctions in general. This is the once famous and now deflated Committee of Eighteen, on which Canada has a representative.
The Committee of Eighteen was empowered to appoint such sub-committees as it might deem necessary for the better accomplishment of its work, and among others, it set up a Committee of Experts appoin ted, one each, by the. governments o( Great Britain, France, Greece, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Republics, and Yugoslavia.
It was the duty of this body of ten experts to examine and report to the Co-ordination Committee on the measures taken by governmen ts in application of the proposals summarized above, and to advise upon any questions put to it, with regard, for instance, to the possibility and expediency of additional sanctions.
The Committee of Experts, after two sessions, one in NO\7~mber' and the other in December, during which it exalnined statements from the governments and the laws passed in their respective countries to give effect to the sanctions proposed, reported on December 13, 1935-In the briefest possible form, the gist of this report was as follows:
I. Four states-Albania, Austria, Hungary, and Paraguay-were taking no action under Article XVI of the Covenan t.
2. Proposal I (Elnbargo on arms and munitions) had been accepted by fifty-two governments and actually put into force by fifty_ 3. Px:oposal II (Prohibition of loans and credits) had been accepted by fifty-two governments, and put into force by forty-seven.
4. Proposal III (Prohibition of imports from Italy) had been accepted by fifty governments and put in to force by forty-three.
5 -Proposal IV (Embargo on transport animals, rubber, and minerals) had been accepted by fifty-one -governments and put into force by forty-five.
6. Proposal V (Mutual economic support) had been accepted by forty-nine governments. .
Mean time, the discussion of further economic pressure had gone on. Already in its meeting of November 6, the Commi ttee of Eigh teen proposed to the govern men ts that petrolep.m, iron) steel, and coal should be added 1:0 the list of prohibited exports. This resolution was the result of a suggestion made by the Canadian member of the Committee, Mr. Riddell; and thereby hangs a tale of humiliation that will long cloud the dawn of diplomatic history in this coun try.
The suggestion that Italy's supply of oil, coal, and iron should be eu t off came quickly to be desci~ibed in the world's press as· the" Canadian Proposal." I twas greeted in I taly with renewed mu tterings of war against tbe sanctionist countries, in particular against Great. Bri tain, inspirer and leader of League action against the invasion of Ethiopia. Correspondents in Rome reported that Italy's chances in such a war were a topic of cafe conversation, and that the conviction of its inevitability was everywhere gaining ground. By the first of December, the .newly elected government of Canada had become frightened into making a dramatic disclaimer.
Mr. Mackenzie I(ing, the prime minister, was resting in Georgia from his election fatigues. Mr. Lapointe, minister of justice . and acting prime minister, after communica ting with his chief, issued from Ottawa the statement that Mr. Riddell's suggestion had been made without instructions, that it was therefore purely a personal contribution from him· to the deliberations of the Committee of Eighteen, and that Canada was taking no initiative in any plan to extend the embargo on trade with Italy. I t was to this disavowal that Mr. King referred when, in the singularly unedifying debate between the leader of the opposition and himself which the co~n try · was called upon to endure at the opening of Parliament, he 'declared it possible that C( bu t for the action of the governnien t of ·Canada in this particular matter at that particular time the whole of Europe might have been aflame today." Such, if the saving grace of humour and proportion be lacking, may seem the power of Canadian premiers even when they go bathing. Had the ora tor been misled, by the hope expressed in some I talian q~arters th~t the oil proposal, having been repudiated by its supposed authors, would now be dropped like a hot coal by a League which I taly's reaction had thrown in to panic? B~t -he knew that the proposal had not been dropped, and his inflated surmise mIght have been corrected by the effect of Mr. Lapointe's announcement in England. The English attitude was, in brief, that while the disclaimer had left Canada in a ludicrous posture, it was of little consequence in the course of world events. The embargo on oil, iron, and coal would . stand or fall on its own possibilities.
The inexcusable thing in the governmen t's conduct was the length of time allowed to elapse between the Canadian representative's suggestion and the disavowal from Ottawa. Mr. Riddell's act vvas in the press on November 4; Mr. Lapointe's statement was issued on Sunday, December 1. It would have been lamentable enough to see an entirely legitimate Canadian lead in the Committee of Eighteen dehied ratification the next morning. The four weeks' delay cO!lld hardly be regarded as anything else than tacit approval, an approval withdrawn at the last in abject surrender to the bellicose attitude of Italy. It is not possible to do more than conjecture what had been passing in the governmental mind. The prime minister informed us that Mr. Riddell had immediately been reprimanded for exceeding his authority, that the government had carefully considered at once publicly' ' repudiating his act and had refrained only because-I quote as before from the parliamentary debates· of February II, 1936-, "we were most anxious not to take any step which might possibly embarrass the situation in Europe or which might appear even remotely to indicate an exception on the part of Canada to what was being done by other parts of the British Empire. In addition to that, we were anxious to hear from Doctor Riddell himself the circumstances surrounding his action." The prime minister went on to say that nothing further would have been done if the proposal had not co' me to be trumpeted about the world as representing the a especial desire of the government of Canada/' whereas it should have been taken · as a proposal made by th~ Committee and not by any particular country or government.
The prime minister's reasons somehow fail to carry conviction, none the less so because he himself took pains to praise them as cc good reasons, wise reasons." Is it possible that the government did not at once, any more perhaps than Mr. Riddell, real~ze that if an additional sanction, suggested by a Canadian representative with the apparent tacit approval of his employers, should prove the last goad need~d to drive the enraged fascist lion in to a war of despair, Canada would then be irrevocably committed to participation in military sanctions?
There is undoubtedly a large body of opinion in this country against any participation in foreign wars, and ,a marked tendency to classify possible recourse by the League of Nations to military measures in that condemned category. This opposition is not confined to the racial bloc in Quebec; it is joined in by other elements which have only recently become vocal. There is, in the first place, a group of pacificists who have contrived to convince themselves of a moral distincti~l1 between economic and military sanctions; then there are those who condemn force as an instrument for the preservation of i.nternational ol~der on the ground that the remedy is as bad as, and indeed , iden tical with, the disease; finally there are some who argue that we should not contribute to any military support of a League with the fatal defects of the present organization.
For most peqple the moral distinction between the stoppage of supplIes on the one hand and resort to mili tary-measures on the other disappears in to thin air with the reflection that, if there is any difference in righteousness between starving a man to death and hitting him over the head with a club, it is probably in favour of the latter. True, the former allows him more time to think and possibly to mend his ways, but that does not give it a distinct lTIoral character. The two methods of repression are simply degrees of severi ty, the use of one or the other depending on the gra vi ty of the offence and the general attitude of the offender. Neither one nor the other can be morally justified except in so far as, without being disproportionately or needlessly drastic, it serves the purpose of . deterring from crime. Both ate equally just and moral if they satisfy this criterion.
The second distinction, also drawn by some respectable persons, is worthy of more consideration. It is based upon a calculation of expediency, the argument being that economic sanctions are compatible with peace but that military sanctions mean war. It is worth while, in other words, to prevent aggression if, and only if, this can be done wi thou t resort to force. Where an aggressor is sufficiently strong and sufficien tly determined to defy all commercial and financial penal ties he must be allowed to have his way, otherwise the desire to preserve peace involves liS in precisely what we wish to avoid, namely, war.
In reply to this it is scarcely worth while to argue that military occupation or naval blockade may, technically speaking, be just as compatible with peace as the cessation of commercial intercourse. For, thoug~ such measures become war only if the state against which they are directed chooses to treat them as acts of war and itself resorts to military OpposItIon, the chance that a strong state will adopt this' course is a high on e.
But, to confine ourselves for the momen t to considera tions of sheer expedi ency, can it ever be expedien t to adopt such a limitation upon the methods of deter-'renee? The answer to this qu~stion must depend upon the value of the objective in view; and many of us feel tha t a war fough t on behalf of the organized in tern a tion al community to prevent a state from achieving selfish , ends by the us'e of force is not too great a price to p'ay for justice between nations and the defence of the weak against the strong. On the other hand, if the international community allows it to be known that sanctions will end with economic pressure, it would seem to foredoom itself to futility. For one thing, the aggressor will merely have to' take up arms against his chastisers to bring sanctions to an end. They must then call off their embargoes or fight to maintain them. And even if the aggressor is not prepared to take so violent a course, it seems doubtful whether economic measures can be counted on to achieve their purpose unless they constitute merely the first stage in one process of constrain t. The offender will make a determined effort to hold out long enough to achieve his objective. Sanctions need not cease, it is true, at that point; they may conceivably be continued un til he is compelled to give back his ill-gotten gains. But the achievement of his objective will harden the aggressor's determination) and he will bank upon the disintegrating effect of time on the combination against him.
In the actual case before us, sanctions have not been discontinued with the declaration of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia. But the disintegrating effect of time is making itself increasingly apparent. It would seem that nothing 'but a fresh determination to carry League principles through to a triumphant conclusion can maintain the existing embargoes, to say nothing of more vigorous measures. We know that I tali an export trade has fallen to a fraction of its former dimensions and, theoretically speaking, a financial debacle seems certain.
The insistent practical question remains: Will the cumulative effect of the sanctions now applied, even if they can be maintained at their presen t level, be sufficien t to force I taly to accept a decision by the League as to what is to be done with her latest conquest?
There is, of course, talk of further pressure, and the advent of a new government in France may possibly bring wi th ita clear decision on the part of that coun try against Italy-. Such a decision may revive the question of oil. I f so, the League will have before it the con-_ elusions of a Committee of Experts which reported on February 12. The gist of that r~port is that an embargo on the export and carriage of oil to I taly would, if universally applied, become fully effective--that is to say, would make it impossibl~ for that country to cover her oil requirements-in a period of from three to three and a half mon ths. This would be true even if the participation of the United State$ were ~onfi:ped to limiting its exports to I taly to the normal level of its exports prior to 1935. If, on the other hand, the United States refused to impose any limi tation whatever, the sole effect of an embargo would be "to render the purchase of petroleum more difficult and expensive." This was already late, and now the campaign is over. Who can tell whether the stoppage of oil, in any meaS\1re now likely to be achieved, would so strangle the economic life of an Italy again at pe~ce that she would bow to the will of the League?
The chief virtue of a plan of collective sanctions, as of any system of pains and penalties, lies not so much in its actual application against the unruly member of the community, as in the foreknowledge that it will come into operation, and will in all probability operate effectively, when an offence is threatened or committed. To provide this foreknowledge, the plan must con template measures adequate to interrupt a course of criminal action. The community, in other words, must be prepared to go the whole length necessary to achieve this result in every possible case of law-bre~king I t cannot be con ten t with haJf-measures. This is an axiom in the police organization of civilized states; it is equally valid in the community of nations.
That is why the conquest of Abyssinia constitutes so critical an event in the history of international organization. If collective sanctions had been sufficien tly efficacious to prevent Italy from making might right, the probability of their having to be employed again would have been immeasurably diminished. As it is, much of the post-War endeavour to s~fegt1ard th~ world's peace would appear to have gone for nothing.
Military sanctions suffer from an undeserved discrimination which results from th~ confusion Qf two things that ought to be kept apart. Many people appear to have the same sort of feeling about them as they have about war undertaken for the furtherance of national policy, whereas they ought to be regarded in precisely the same light as the use of force for police purposes within the state. One may regret the con tinued necessity of such force; only the fanatic c011demns it as immoral or inexpedien t.
There is another type of conscientious objector who, while content to see this country participating in economic sanctions, would not go to the length of miIi tary measures on behalf of the League of Nations as now constituted. This attitude clearly ' violates what to some of us will seem a fundamental principle, namely, that if an institution is ~orth supporting, it deserves all the support tha t can be given without sacrificing more essential interests. Assuming for the moment that we have more vital interests than the establishment of efficient machinery for the preservation of lasting peace, would Canada sacrifice any of these by standing ready to furnish whatever military assistance might reasonably be asked of her in this crisis of the League's life?
But what is worth investigating in this attitude is the qualification-CC as the League is now constituted." The point made by the critics here is that our present League of Nations is totally' undeveloped on one side. It has machinery for the settlement of disputes and, though it has been inefficiently used, 'for the prevention of successful aggression; but it has no device for satisfying the legitimate demands of economically or poli tic ally underprivileged nations It has the means of ascertaining and enforcing existing law, but no apparatus for changing the law where change is needed.
It renders static what now is, offering no active principles of evolution. It is a League of the Haves against the Have-nots. Article XIX of the Coven an t, with its timid -suggestion that the Assembly may call attention to treaties that need revision and to conditions that threaten peace, offers no promise whatever of action. If peace is to be preserved, we must have a.mechanism for relieving congested populations, for the equitable distribution of essential raw materials and for the removal of unfair discriminations against nations or races. Thus, and only thus, by the eradication of its causes, can war be abolished.
Within the last ten years there has been a marked advance towards general realization of this need of peaceful change. It is a fallacy to maintain that it was fully unders tood in 1919 and tha t the League of Nations was from the beginning intended to exercise the function of readjustment as vigorously as that of law enforcement. The proof lies in the very weakness of Article XIX, which is the only reference in the Coven an t to this essen tial phase of in terna tional govemmen t.
But can this lack be an excuse for milk-and-water support? Every attempt to establish a new institution must have some regard to existing facts; and it is a fact that the mass of humanity was in 1919, and still is, far more'anxious to build an organization which will prevent violence now than to make provision for the alteration of conditions which eventually mU$t lead again -to violence. This preference, or order, is true of the whole history of politics. Society has always organized first for defence outside and the maintenance of peace within; legislative organization for the removal of inequalities comes after that. The weight of human experience is on the side of those who say: "Show us that you can solve conflicts, of interest without recourse to war, and we will thel1 study means of achieving 3:' fairer distribution of the world's wealth and opportunity." I t may be that in this humanity flies in the face of logic, that it should always have gone stra,ight at the task of removing the causes of disputes; but if we can so much as approach, in the internatio~al sphere, what has been accomplished by an illogical method within the national socie~y, we shall have enduring cause for satisfaction.
Taking the long view, studen ts of the origin and growth of political insti tu tions may feel confiden t that the next great advance in the art of politics' must be the effective organization of the international community. But for the moment the outlook is not bright, and the anxiety which afflicts most of us is, to put it in a nutshell, whether the decade or two ilnmedia tely before us will leave any civilization to organize~ Japan presses on with her domination of China, Germany consolidates the Rhineland and looks eastward for new fields to conquer, I taly crowns her king Emperor of Ethiopia. Among the remaining members of the League two opposite movemen ts are developing.
One looks towards a "stronger League," the other towards disintegration. Discussions are proceeding in London which may determine whether the governments of the Bri6sh Commonwealth will range themselves with the strengtheners ot with the scuttlers. Surely, however, no decision to abandon or even to suspend the effort for collective security can be reached without first giving to our peoples ample opportunity to express themselves. Let us therefore prepare ourselves to deal honestly and in telligen tly wi th an issue of immense rnomen t.
As a first step, let us ask ourselves wh;:tt strengthening the League 1'l1:eans. It must be apparent to everyone who has followed the Abyssiniiiln affair that the existing Covenant is far stronger than any action that was taken under it. If we cannot use the strength available, what is the hope) and what would be the use, of adding further strength? Assuredly there are ambiguities that might be removed and gaps that might be filled; but the essential thing is not a tightening of the machinery, it is ' more seriousness and more courage in those who set it up. Here is the point at which every Canadi' an concerned about the part played by this Dominion in the world's work must take stock of his own and his government's attitude.
The Canadian government's flight from responsibility on December I came as a sorry climax to a series of exhibitions of half-heartedness. In 1920 we began by an attempt to delete Article X of the Covenant; failing in this, we laboured for an interpretation which leaves to each member of the League the right to determine how far ' i t will go in upholding by -mili tary means the mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence; at the same time we refused to 'participate in a proposed discussion of the distribution of raw materials; in 1924 we rejected the 'protocol designed to fill gaps in the anti-war organization; in 1932 we condoned, by our consent to a policy of inaction, Japan's rape of Manchuria; and finally, at the end of 1935, in a retreat which brought shame to Canadians everywhere, we denied our name to a proposal that would have done more than anything else to impede I taly's campaign of "civilization" in Ethiopia.
If this shillyshallying is to continue, it would be better for our national dignity to withdraw from the League. As for the cause of peace, that can hardly benefi t appreciably from the lukewarm approval which our continued but paSSlve membership appears to signify; and there are many Canadians whose every instinct urges that we ei ther go in to this business of international organization with energy and courage or get out of it altogether. Complete withdrawal, after due notice as required by the Covenant, would be honest, if regrettable; but a formal membership, unsustained by the determination to accept its full implications, is unendurable hypocrisy.
